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Iran and their Proxies

Key background
  • The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces with a constitutional mandate for guaranteeing the Islamic Republic’s integrity and projecting its influence abroad. In practice, this manifests as supporting Iranian allies and proxies with funds, weapons, and training.
  • Many of its allies and proxies are terrorist groups and human rights abusers including: Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, the Houthis, Syrian Arab Republic, and Russia.
  • Iran is the world’s leading enabler and facilitator of terrorism, especially targeting the US and its allies. It has also targeted diplomatic missions and diaspora Jews.
Reserve forces from the 226th Brigade, under the command of the 146th Division, are operating south of the forward defence line in southern Lebanon, April 28, 2026.
Reserve forces from the 226th Brigade, under the command of the 146th Division, are operating south of the forward defence line in southern Lebanon, April 28, 2026. Photo credit: IDF

Updated April 29, 2026

Hezbollah drone attacks expose limits of Lebanon ceasefire

What’s happened:  Israel suffered another casualty in southern Lebanon, when an Israeli civilian working as a contractor for the Defence Ministry was killed in a Hezbollah drone attack yesterday.

  • Amer Hujirat, 44 years old from Shfaram was operating heavy engineering machinery supporting the IDF near Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon. His 19-year-old son was working with him at the time and was lightly injured in the attack.
  • Once more, Hezbollah used a fibre optic-guided drone in the attack, as it did in the attack earlier this week which killed Sgt. Idan Fooks. These drones, also known as FPV’s, cannot be electronically jammed. The only method to defeat to them is to shoot them down, which has proven to be difficult. Hezbollah has made extensive use of this weapon in the last two weeks, which it apparently started using as far back as 2024.
  • The IDF destroyed two enormous tunnels in southern Lebanon that had been built by Hezbollah over the course of the last decade. The two tunnels were located about 11 km north of the border with Israel and reached about 26 metres underground. One was 700 metres long and the other 1200 metres long, and they were not connected to each other.
  • The two tunnel compounds contained living quarters, staging areas, and access routes to launch sites, as well as large weapons stores. Each could have been used by hundreds of Hezbollah fighters to launch an October 7-style invasion of northern Israel. They were discovered by the IDF during the intense fighting which broke out in March following Hezbollah rocket attacks.
  • Captured Hezbollah fighters provided crucial intelligence that allowed the IDF to clear out the tunnels and eventually destroy them yesterday in a massive controlled explosion that used 500 tons of explosives and was so large that it registered on seismographs in northern Israel as an earthquake.

Context: The informal ceasefire, where low-level attacks continue, but where Israel refrains from retaliating in Beirut due to limitations imposed by the US so as not to interfere with the ongoing negotiations in Iran, continues.

  • Israeli frustration with this informal ceasefire, which leaves IDF soldiers behind the forward defensive line, but vulnerable to attacks without Israel having the means to exact a price for attacks on its soldiers, has become a source of frustration for the army.
  • At the same time, the US continues to push Israel and Lebanon to reach a diplomatic agreement that would exceed the measures of a ceasefire, even if it might fall short of a full peace treaty. Media reports have indicated that Egypt too has taken on a mediator role in the negotiations. European governments too have indicated that they would be willing to help Lebanon carry out a disarmament of Hezbollah, a sentiment echoed publicly by EU Commission President von der Leyen.
  • The holding pattern of the Lebanon fighting exists at the insistence of the United States while it pursues a negotiated settlement in the larger conflict with Iran, of which the Lebanon conflict remains a secondary front. On Monday, the Iranians proposed a deal through Pakistani intermediaries that would have seen an immediate end to their blockade of the Straits of Hormuz as well as the American blockade on Iranian ports as a first step to further negotiations on the nuclear programme. It also would have committed the U.S. to  a full end to the war with Iran. The Trump administration appears to have rejected this proposal.
  • As the US continues to build up its forces in the region in anticipation of a possible collapse of the ceasefire which has been in effect for more than three weeks now, the administration has begun signalling publicly in the last day that might prefer a long-term economic squeeze on Iran over either of the two options that were until very recently seen as the most likely — a negotiated agreement or a renewal of the war with a massive attack on Iranian infrastructure.
  • The negotiations that have taken place have dealt exclusively with the Iranian nuclear programme and not, as far as is publicly known, with either the Iranian ballistic missile programme or with Iran’s support of it proxy network in the region. This has led to a great deal of frustration on the part of Israeli officials, who, in leaks to local media, also indicate that Jerusalem is not always fully updated on the diplomatic developments or American positions regarding Iran.
  • The talks included various proposals for moving highly enriched uranium out of Iran, but foundered on the American insistence on a 20-year commitment from Iran not to engage in enrichment activities. The Iranians, according to Pakistanis mediators, were unwilling to commit to more than five years.
  • Assuming that gap could be bridged, an agreement along the lines discussed would an unwelcome development from the Israeli perspective. It would leave Iran free to develop more ballistic missiles, and the lifting of sanctions would rescue a regime precisely at its weakest moment, while allowing to further finance its terrorist proxies closer to Israel. At the same time, a new round of fighting without a decisive conclusion or an American “declaration of victory” and departure could be even worse. The possibility of a continued blockade on Iran while a temporary ceasefire remains in place could be the least bad option.
  • The US too, appears to coming to that conclusion — or at the very least, wanting to create a public impression that is coming to that conclusion. Multiple reports today in US media quoted Trump administration officials as preparing for an extended blockade of Iran as the US’s best near-term strategy, with officials estimating that the economic costs to Iran of the status quo are much higher than they are to the US or its allies. Iran has apparently taken to “junk storage” of oil surpluses, as unsold oil, blocked in port by the US Navy, has filled its existing storage capacities and left it in a position where it might soon need to halt production altogether.

Looking ahead: Trump has extended the ceasefire indefinitely as long as negotiations are underway.

  • At the same time, the US continues its force buildup in the region, with a third carrier strike group arriving this week. The USS George HW Bush joins the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R Ford, already in theatre.
  • Some 50,000 ground troops are also stationed across the region in American bases, a significant change from the buildup that presaged the February 28 launch of hostilities.

April 23, 2026

Israel marks Independence Day amid fragile ceasefires

People celebrate Israel’s 78th Independence Day at Sacher Park in Jerusalem, April 22, 2026.
People celebrate Israel’s 78th Independence Day at Sacher Park in Jerusalem, April 22, 2026. Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90

What’s happened: Israel celebrated 78 years of statehood yesterday. It was the first Independence Day Israel has marked since the October 7 invasion and massacre without any hostages being held in Gaza.

  • The State of Israel’s population stands at 10.2 million people, more than twelvefold since the state was founded in 1948. This includes 7.8 million Jews, roughly 45% of the world’s total.
  • Celebrations of Israel’s independence took place throughout the country yesterday without incident, as ceasefires in wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran mostly held. An exception to that was a Hezbollah rocket attack on IDF positions in southern Lebanon and several nearby Israeli communities inside northern Israel on Tuesday evening.
  • Today, ambassadors to the United States from both Israel and Lebanon will renew talks begun at the beginning of the ceasefire last week. They will be joined by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and, for the first time, by the US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee.
  • The White House outlined its public positions on the Iran conflict yesterday, with White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt emphasising the US position on the nuclear issue, rather than on other issues which had been raised earlier such as Iran’s ballistic missile programme or its network of regional proxies. “Iran can never obtain a nuclear bomb to threaten the United States and our allies,” she told reporters, “and they must turn over the enriched uranium that’s in their possession.”
  • Both the US and Iran released videos of their forces enforcing their respective blockades. US videos showed a forced boarding of a ship near the Strait of Hormuz and of another unflagged ship, linked to Iran, in the Indo-Pacific, which was carrying 2 million barrels of Iranian oil that had been loaded at Kharg Island.
  • The US blockade operation has been called Operation Economic Fury, following on the kinetic campaign which was known as Operation Epic Fury. Iranian forces fired on and disabled at least three ships attempting to transit into the Gulf of Oman through the Straits.

Context: The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah declared on April 16 was due to last ten days. It did not stipulate any territorial changes, but rather kept positions frozen in place, leaving the IDF in control of swathe of Lebanese territory a few kilometres deep.

  • The Lebanese proposal to extend the ceasefire by one month (ten days in some media reports) would maintain these positions, and not require any withdrawals by the IDF. But the Lebanese proposal includes a demand that Israel stop demolitions inside the zone of southern Lebanon that it holds and would presumably continue to hold for the additional month of a ceasefire extension.
  • Israeli media report that some 20 Lebanese villages abutting the Israeli border are in the process of being demolished by Israeli bulldozers, many of which have been moved up from Gaza to complete the mission as quickly as possible.
  • In previous rounds of fighting, the IDF has watched as Hezbollah accessed weapons caches stored in residences in these villages and used them to conduct attacks on Israeli border communities. Particularly problematic from the Israeli perspective was the use of anti-tank fire on homes in Israeli communities along the border.
  • The present demolitions are intended to ensure that this pattern is not repeated, even in the event of a full Israeli withdrawal at some future point.
  • This fits into a larger Israeli lesson learned since the October 7 attacks. At the time, Israel made the decision to evacuate frontline communities on the northern border at the same time that a similar evacuation was necessary along the Gaza envelope.
  • For more than a year, tens of thousands (well over 100,000 at one point) of Israelis from both north and south were in temporary housing and hotels. Israeli officials have largely come to see the northern evacuation as a mistake that handed Hezbollah an unjustified victory.
  • While the US waits to see if Iran will moderate its position on any of the issues under negotiation, its naval blockade continues. So too do preparations for a renewed aerial assault on Iran to begin immediately with the end of the ceasefire. The US has now positioned a third aircraft carrier in the vicinity. Israeli officials anticipate that a renewed US air operation would last several days and would target Iran’s energy infrastructure.
  • Recent days have also seen repeated reports of another global power’s increasing involvement in efforts to hammer out a deal — China. Beijing is reportedly pressuring Iran to reach a compromise with the United States that would reopen the Straits of Hormuz, whose closure threatens China’s economy far more than it does those of the US and its Western allies.

Looking ahead: The ceasefire in Lebanon is due to expire on April 26. Efforts are underway in Washington to mediate a durable agreement between Israel and Lebanon, or, failing that, to extend the ceasefire so that negotiations can continue. The Lebanese have requested a one-month extension on the ceasefire. Israel’s position on this possibility is not publicly known.

  • The ceasefire declared in Iran on April 8 was originally due to last only two weeks. According to multiple US media reports, all sides have agreed to extend it until at least this coming Sunday. This would put the expiration of the Iran ceasefire on the same day as the expiration of the Lebanon ceasefire.
  • The parallel blockades have hurt all sides in the conflict, but don’t appear to be driving anyone to moderate their positions. The IMF warned this week that in a “severe scenario” of long-term blockade, global GDP could decline by 2% in 2026.

April 20, 2026

Iranian proxy targets London Jewish sites

View of Regent Street in London, England. September 23, 2022.
View of Regent Street in London, England. September 23, 2022. Photo by Nati Shohat/Flash90

What’s happened: Police have opened an investigation into Iranian links to a series of arson attacks on Jewish targets in London.

  • On Saturday night, Kenton United Synagogue was targeted in an arson attack; two teenagers were arrested.
  • Chief Rabbi Sir Ephraim Mirvis said the Kenton fire, which did not cause any significant damage, was the third “cowardly” attack on Jewish sites in London in less than a week.
  • Posting on X Mirvis said, “A sustained campaign of violence and intimidation against the Jewish community of the UK is gathering momentum…Thank God, no lives have been lost, but we cannot, and must not, wait for that to change before we understand just how dangerous this moment is for all of our society.”
  • On Friday night, there was another attempted arson attack on a building  with links to the Jewish community, while last week, police arrested two suspects over an attempted arson attack on another synagogue in the capital.
  • Prime Minister Starmer said, “This is abhorrent, and it will not be tolerated. Attacks on our Jewish community are attacks on Britain.”
  • The Pro-Iranian group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) or Movement of the Companions of the Right Hand of Islam, has said it is responsible, and posted a video purporting to show the attack on the Kenton synagogue on social media.

Context: Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) are a recently established Iranian proxy group. They have only been active since Israel and the US began their military campaign against Iran on 28th February 2026, and are likely part of Tehran’s retaliation strategy against Israel.

  • HAYI’s activities are assessed as almost certainly being part of a broader Iranian intelligence service-led psychological warfare campaign against Israel using diaspora Jewish communities as a proxy target.
  • HAYI represent a low-cost and low-risk asset which is almost certainly easy to operate with a degree of deniability, yet able to achieve significant cognitive effects on an adversary target audience, as well as divert responding local security agency resources.
  • Often described as a cut-out, they primarily exist on Telegram and are not believed to have members in a traditional sense. They are assessed as likely being controlled and directed by an Iranian intelligence service, i.e. the IRGC.
  • HAYI target Jewish and Zionist organisations with relatively unsophisticated arson attacks. Rather than attempting spectacular attacks to maximise casualties, HAYI tends to use or claims to have used incendiary devices or drones against these organisations, then creates videos of the attacks which are uploaded onto Iranian-linked Telegram channels.
  • HAYI’s claimed attacks include:
    • An explosion at a synagogue in Liege, Belgium on 9th March.
    • A claimed attack on an unspecified site in Greece on 11th March. No evidence of any such attack has been found.
    • An arson attack on a synagogue in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on 13th March.
    • An explosion at a Jewish school in Amsterdam, the Netherlands on 14th March.
    • An arson attack on ambulances belonging to the Hatzolo charity in Golders Green, London on 23rd March. HAYI claimed that the adjacent synagogue was targeted.
    • An attack against the Bank of America in Paris was foiled by French authorities in on 29th March. The bank had been named as a potential target on HAYI’s Telegram channel.
    • A failed arson attack at a synagogue in Finchley, London, on 15th April.
    • An arson attack at Iran International’s parent company’s studios in Park Royal, London on 15th April
    • A claimed radioactive drone attack against the Israeli Embassy in Kensington, London, on 16th April. The Metropolitan Police and Israeli MFA have since confirmed that the Embassy was not attacked.
    • A failed arson attack at a Jewish charity (Jewish Futures) with links to Israel’s former offices in Hendon, London on 17th April.
    • A failed arson attack at a synagogue in Kenton, London on 18th April.
  • While investigations have been led or supported by Counter Terrorism Policing, they are being treated as antisemitic hate crimes rather than terrorist attacks.
  • The Metropolitan Police have said that the arson attack on Jewish Futures was “not being linked to other incidents in the northwest London area over the last week or last month’s arson in Golders Green”.
  • This is likely due to a level of distance between HAYI and its assessed Iranian intelligence service sponsors, as well as the fact that the group has not yet been proscribed. If HAYI were to be proscribed then acts linked to them would likely be investigated by Counter Terrorism Policing by default. It could also make sharing their videos an offence under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
  • HAYI’s Telegram channel was deactivated shortly after March’s Golders Green attack. It peaked with approximately 200 followers. Footage of its attacks are now distributed on other major Iranian regime-linked channels including Sabereen News and Almihwar News.
  • HAYI’s agents are assessed as highly likely to be recruited online with promises of payment after providing evidence of following their handlers’ instructions, primarily using encrypted messaging apps such as Signal or Telegram to communicate.
  • In line with other examples of Russian and Iranian-sponsored espionage and terrorist activities against the UK and Israel, recruits typically lack a particular religious or ideological affinity for those they act on behalf of, and are motivated by money.
  • For example, both the Wagner Group and Iranian intelligence services have contracted local or European criminals to act on their behalf in the UK, i.e. to attack and burn down Ukrainian-owned businesses or conduct surveillance on Iran International’s studios.

Looking ahead: President Trump’s two week deadline for negotiations with Iran expires on Wednesday.  

  • Whilst significant gaps remain between the US and Iranian position, it remains unclear if they will reach an agreement or the deadline will be extended or there will be a resumption of hostilities.  

April 16, 2026

Trump announces Netanyahu and Aoun due to speak directly

View of the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C., April 14, 2026.
View of the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C., April 14, 2026. Photo by Arie Leib Abrams/Flash90

What’s happened: President Trump announced that leaders of Israel and Lebanon are due to speak to each other directly today.

  • Prime Minister Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun are expected to discuss efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Israeli-Lebanese war raging since Hezbollah launched rocket attacks on northern Israel on March 2, violating a ceasefire that had been in place since November 2024.
  • Direct talks were held yesterday in Washington between Israel’s ambassador to the US Yehiel Leiter and his Lebanese counterpart Nada Hamadeh Moawad, together with US Secretary of State  Rubio. A joint statement issued by the three parties said only that they had held “productive discussions toward launching direct negotiations.”
  • The war was still ongoing this morning, despite reports in Lebanese media that a ceasefire might go into effect overnight. Israeli operations have been limited to southern Lebanon, apparently in line with a US demand not to launch further strikes on Beirut following a large air strike on April 8.
  • Hezbollah rocket fire and drone strikes on  towns and villages in northern Israel continued as well both last night and this morning, with no fatalities reported and one injury in the Arab town of Tamra.
  • In southern Lebanon, one IDF soldier was seriously wounded and four other lightly wounded in a Hezbollah rocket attack.
  • On the ground, the IDF continues to operate in and around the Hezbollah stronghold of Bint Jbeil. Commenting on that battle and the larger war, Netanyahu said last night, “We are about to decisively defeat Bint Jbeil, to eliminate this large Hezbollah stronghold. Meanwhile, yesterday I instructed the IDF to continue to reinforce the security zone, and to expand it eastward to the slopes of Mount Hermon so that we might be able to help even better our Druze brothers during their time of need.”
  • Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir visited IDF troops in southern Lebanon yesterday. Speaking with soldiers, he reported that the IDF estimates it has eliminated 1,700 Hezbollah fighters since the war broke out in March. He also said that he had already approved operational plans for further combat in both Lebanon and Iran, to be implemented should ceasefire talks fail.
  • Regarding the competing blockades around the Strait of Hormuz, CENTCOM reported that ten ships had been turned around by the US naval blockade. At the same time, it appears at least two US-sanctioned supertankers made it into the Gulf despite the US blockade. Some media reports have indicated that Iran might consider letting ships pass through the Omani side of the Straits of Hormuz without hindrance, but it was unclear if this proposal was relating to a comprehensive settlement or a confidence-building measure while talks were ongoing.

Context: Direct talks between a Lebanese and Israeli leader, much less publicly known direct talks, would be highly unusual, as Lebanese law technically still forbids any kind of communication of any Lebanese citizen with any Israeli.

  • Israel’s demands for a ceasefire with Lebanon are a revised and improved version of the ceasefire that ended the previous round of fighting in November 2024. As in the 2024 ceasefire, Israel insists on full freedom of action for the IDF to operate in Lebanon to enforce provisions of the ceasefire, both north and south of the Litani River. Also in line with the earlier ceasefire, Israel insists on a Lebanese commitment to disarm Hezbollah. But in the new ceasefire, Israel would like to see this actually carried out, and is therefore insisting on some form of US oversight for the disarmament.
  • A more dramatic departure from previous ceasefire regards territory. In the previous ceasefire, Israel held on to five strongpoints in southern Lebanon, with a long-term commitment to withdraw. In current discussions, Israel is asking for a buffer zone to be established which would be completely clear of Hezbollah presence (it is unclear if in the immediate term civilians evacuated from these areas would be allowed to return, especially those in areas that would place Israelis in range of anti-tank fire).
  • The implication of such a buffer zone would be a longer-term IDF presence until some kind of more stable diplomatic arrangement can be negotiated. Notably, according to reports in Israeli media at least, Lebanon itself has not insisted on an immediate or full withdrawal of Israeli forces from its territory.
  • Another minor taboo that was broken in the initial talks between Israel and Lebanon was the discussion of economic issues. A weakening of Hezbollah by Israel followed by a full disarmament by the Lebanese state under US supervision is expected to open the door to massive investment and reconstruction by two large US allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
  • This has introduced a new incentive for Lebanon to do what it has been unable or unwilling to do until now. Especially it has been in a deep economic crisis now for over a decade.
  • All sides agree that the war in Lebanon is a secondary front to the larger war between Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other.  

Looking ahead: Based on leaks to the media, the initial round of US-Iran talks last week was not the complete failure it had been largely reported to have been and negotiations are set to continue, even after Vice President Vance’s departure from Islamabad.

  • Pakistani efforts to mediate between the sides, along with parallel efforts from Turkey and Egypt, have yielded a few areas of possible consensus.
  • According to media reports, the US is prepared to establish a $250 billion aid fund for Iran in the event of an agreed conclusion to the war that meets its demands.
  • It is willing to recognise Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear programme, while insisting on a 20-year ban on enrichment. It is also demanding that Iran turn over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
  • The Iranians, for their part, have proposed depleting the highly enriched uranium they still have on Iranian soil with international supervision, which would also make it unusable for weapons purposes.
  • Negotiations between the US and Iran are also reported to cover both the fighting in Lebanon and the position of the Houthis in Yemen. At the same time, there are no public reports that the talks have touched upon an issue that was central to both the US and Israeli war effort, namely the Iranian ballistic missile programme.

April 13, 2026

US prepares naval blockade of Iran after Islamabad talks collapse

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is pictured transiting the Arabian Sea in support of Operation Epic Fury. March 27, 2026.
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is pictured transiting the Arabian Sea in support of Operation Epic Fury. March 27, 2026. Photo credit: US CENTCOM / X

What’s happened: Vice President JD Vance left Islamabad after the highest level of diplomatic contact between Iran and the United States in nearly half a century failed to yield an agreement.

  • According to Iranian sources, the main areas of contention were the Straits of Hormuz, Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the question of war reparations. The US has demanded an immediate reopening of the Straits, which have been blocked by Iran in recent weeks, and had earlier indicated that the Iranians had a agreed to reopen it as a condition for the ceasefire.
  • The US has also demanded that all of Iran’s stockpile of HEU be handed over to a third country. Over the past week, there were conflicting reports regarding Iranian flexibility on the issue, but ultimately there was not an agreement in Islamabad. Iran has also demanded reparations for damage from Israeli and US air strikes, and there is no indication that this is something US negotiators took seriously.
  • Following the collapse of talks in Islamabad, President Trump announced a US naval blockade of all shipping to and from Iran in the Persian Gulf. Since Iran began blockading non-Iranian shipping in the Strait, its vessels have been among the only ones to transit the Strait. A successful US blockade would cut Iran off from this economic lifeline, but it would also further exacerbate strained energy markets.
  • The UK has ruled out taking any part in the US-led naval blockade.
  • Before the war, roughly 150 vessels transited through the Straits on average day. The same number, 150, transited in the entire month of March — daily average of 5 ships. In the first four days of the ceasefire, 40 ships have transited, a daily average of 10, double the number during the war, but still fall below prewar levels. It is not known whether any of these paid tolls or made other financial arrangements with Iranian authorities to do so.
  • In a media interview, Trump hinted that US and Iranian negotiators had closed gaps on a number of issues (without specifying), but that the Iranians couldn’t come to agreement because they refused to give up their nuclear programme. Pakistani officials speaking to US media played down the significance of the talks’ failure, with one saying that “the talks are not dead. There’s a stalemate.”  

Context: Despite Israel and the US planning and executing the war as partners, Israel is not involved in the ceasefire talks and remained concerned over the weekend that a deal could be agreed that would not meet their red lines.

  • Israel continues to insist with the backing of the US that the ceasefire with Iran does not include Lebanon, but nevertheless it has scaled back the intensity of its offensive, and avoided striking Beirut over the last few days.      
  • The most significant combat is currently focused on the small southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil, where a large contingent of Hezbollah fighters is holed up and surrounded by the IDF. Yesterday Hezbollah fighters were seen using the Bint Jbeil hospital for surveillance and for transferring and storing weapons. The IDF raided the facility, captured weapons, and eliminated 20 Hezbollah terrorists.
  • Bint Jbeil was the site of a pitched battle in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. An unsuccessful IDF operation to take the town in the second week of the war became a particularly traumatic turning point in the war.
  • At the same time Hezbollah continues to fire missiles, rockets and drones towards  northern Israel.
  • In parallel, Israel is preparing to enter into direct talks with Lebanon through their respective emissaries in Washington.    
  • The last time such a high-profile meeting of Lebanese and Israeli officials took place was at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. That conference led to additional talks in Moscow between Israel and some of the participants, but the Lebanese ultimately pulled out. Direct talks during the First Lebanon War led to a rarely remembered peace treaty in 1983, but this was never ratified by Lebanon, and under intense domestic and regional pressure, not least from the Assad regime in Syria, Lebanon formally abrogated the treaty in 1984.
  • Meanwhile in Gaza the US have submitted to Hamas their detailed plan for the Strip’s demilitarisation. US officials have made clear that they expect Hamas’ answer to the proposal this week. Without an agreement on disarmament, the ceasefire will stall, and it is possible that the IDF will renew its offensive in Gaza, but this time without the need to hold back its firepower as Hamas no longer holds  Israeli hostages.
  • The US-led Board of Peace has demanded that Hamas agree to a disarmament and in exchange Israeli forces would withdraw from most of the 53% of the Gaza Strip where the IDF is currently present, and redeploy instead to a narrow buffer zone. An agreement on disarmament would also end restrictions on the entry of essential goods, provide for an amnesty for Hamas fighters, and facilitate the entry of trailers for temporary shelter to replace tents.
  • The implementation of such an agreement would also see the entry into Gaza of two new bodies envisioned by the comprehensive ceasefire plan. The first is the Palestinian committee of technocrats charged with running the day-to-day affairs of the Strip as a transitional governing body. These have already been appointed, but not allowed into Gaza. The second is the International Stabilisation Force, charged with security on the ground and ceasefire enforcement. The makeup of this force is still not entirely clear. But like the governing body, its arrival would only come following an agreement on demilitarisation. (The future of Gaza governance is explained in this BICOM short.)

Looking ahead: The US blockade of the Strait is due to go into effect this evening.  

  • Talks between the  Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors to the US  are due to begin tomorrow.

April 10, 2026

Israel to begin direct negotiations with Lebanon

The IDF Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, during a situational assessment on the outskirts of Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon.
The IDF Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, during a situational assessment on the outskirts of Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon. April 9, 2026.

What’s happened:  On Thursday night Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that, “Following repeated requests from the Lebanese government to open peace negotiations with us, last night I instructed the Cabinet to begin direct negotiations with Lebanon.”

  • He added that the talks would have two goals: “First, the disarming of Hezbollah. Second, a historic, sustainable peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon.”
  • At the same time he sought to reassure the residents of the north that currently, “there is no ceasefire in Lebanon. We are continuing to strike Hezbollah with full force, and we will not stop until we restore your security.”
  • Late Thursday night, a single missile fired by Hezbollah at central Israel was intercepted. Nobody was injured and no damage was caused. Earlier, missiles were fired at Haifa and Haifa Bay. Some were intercepted and others fell in uninhabited areas. Hezbollah also continued to fire rockets at border communities throughout the night. Nobody was injured and no damage was caused.
  • Earlier this week the IDF conducted the largest coordinated strike across Lebanon since the start of the war. According to the IDF, “within 10 minutes and across multiple areas simultaneously,” the IDF targeted “more than 100 Hezbollah command centres and military sites.”
  • The IDF added that most of the infrastructure struck “was located within the heart of the civilian population, as part of Hezbollah’s cynical exploitation of Lebanese civilians as human shields in order to safeguard its operations. Prior to the strikes, steps were taken to mitigate harm to uninvolved individuals as much as possible.”
  • Lebanese officials are divided over the prospects of talks with Israel, with some trying to condition them on first reaching a ceasefire, whilst others who oppose Hezbollah think negotiations should be held even under fire.  

Context: As the fragile, temporary ceasefire with Iran holds, Israel continues to insist that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire.

  • Despite Iranian and Pakistani claims to the contrary, various senior US officials have backed Israel’s position, including Vice President JD Vance who told reporters yesterday that, “the Iranians thought that the ceasefire included Lebanon, and it just didn’t. We never made that promise. We never indicated that was going to be the case. What we said is that the ceasefire would be focused on Iran, and the ceasefire would be focused on America’s allies, both Israel and the Gulf Arab states.” White House Press Secretary Leavitt added that, “Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire. That has been related to all parties involved in the ceasefire.”
  • Israel sees this as a favourable position that poses a dilemma to Iran. If Iran continues to hold its fire, it will have abandoned Hezbollah, whilst if Iran opens fire, it will cause Israel and the US to resume strikes with greater intensity.
  • Pakistan, the new intermediaries in the ceasefire, drew international criticism, as their Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif stated In  now-deleted post on X (formerly Twitter) that “Israel is evil and a curse for humanity” going on to say “I hope and pray people who created this cancerous state on Palestinian land to get rid of European jews burn in hell.”
  • Within Israel there are mixed views over the successes garnered throughout the war. IDF Chief of Staff Zamir declared on Thursday the achievements in the war against Iran are “unprecedented and historic. The Iran from before this war is not the same Iran; it is much weaker. We are prepared to return to intense fighting at any given moment if required.” Nevertheless there is concern over how to translate the military achievements into a strategic victory, particularly regarding Iran’s remaining stockpile of highly enriched uranium.        
  • In the background, the US has also encouraged the Israeli government to pursue the direct talks with Lebanon. This followed significant comments from Lebanese President Joseph Aoun from the beginning of the war when he explicitly blamed Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into the conflict and even called for efforts to reach normalisation with Israel.
  • This was a significant positive development that reflects the domestic anger toward Hezbollah for importing a conflict at the behest of Iran against the interests of the Lebanese population. Israel did not formally respond to Aoun’s proposal until last night.
  • Despite Israel’s public commitment to continue striking Hezbollah, it is expected that the intensity will now be reduced. However the IDF’s ground operation is expected to continue with efforts focused at removing Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The IDF are also expected to retaliate against Hezbollah for any attacks on Israel’s home front.  
  • According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, 1,888 Lebanese have been killed although they do not distinguish between Hezbollah operatives and civilians. According to the Israeli military over 1,400 Hezbollah members have so far been eliminated during the war.          
  • The starting point for the talks is expected to be based on UN Resolution 1701 from 2006, that never fully implemented  the removal of all terrorist infrastructure south of the Litani River. In addition Lebanon is expected to reaffirm its commitment to the agreement signed in November, 2024. Significantly, this authorised Israel to continue to target Hezbollah fighters  and in general prevent their efforts to rearm.
  • In response to the latest developments, the UK government has taken a position questioning Israel’s ongoing actions against Hezbollah. Asked about the Israeli strikes on Hezbollah, Prime Minister Keir Starmer said, “That shouldn’t be happening. That should stop. That’s my strong view,” adding that “it’s not a technical matter, but a matter of principle.” Starmer made the remarks in Bahrain during his trip to the Middle East. The same position was also shared by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, in a development that appears to further strain the special relationship between the UK and the US.
  • Behind the scenes it is thought that Israel and Lebanon have been exchanging messages for more than a year. Both governments have a shared interest in limiting Hezbollah outsized influence, with the efforts thought to include intelligence sharing of the movements of Hezbollah members and the locations of its hidden weapons storehouses.  
  • There remains residual concern over whether the Lebanese Armed Forces are either unwilling or unable to confront Hezbollah, which is also why Israel insists on retaining its freedom of operation.

Looking ahead: Direct negotiations are expected to begin next week in Washington.

  • Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tasked Israel’s ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter to represent Israel.
  • The US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa will facilitate the talks. The Lebanese delegation will be headed by Simon Karam, a former Lebanese ambassador to the US and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, leader of the Shiite Amal Party.

April 7, 2026

Family of four killed in Haifa as IDF deepens campaign in Iran and Lebanon

Israeli rescue forces search the scene where a missile fired from Iran struck a building in Haifa, northern Israel, causing extensive damage, April 6, 2026.
Israeli rescue forces search the scene where a missile fired from Iran struck a building in Haifa, northern Israel, causing extensive damage, April 6, 2026. Photo by David Cohen/Flash90

What’s happened: In Haifa, a family of four were killed in their apartment on Sunday by an Iranian missile. It was the second deadliest incident of the war so far, behind only the attack on the synagogue in Beit Shemesh which killed nine people on the second day of the war.

  • Nearly all missiles are intercepted, but a small percentage get through, including illegal cluster munitions, which spread bomblets over a wide ares. Such was the case yesterday with a cluster munitions which hit homes around the Tel Aviv area, causing injuries but no fatalities.
  • The Israeli home front continues to face barrages of missiles and rocket fire from Iran, Lebanon, and occasionally Yemen. Along Israel’s northern border, constant rocket fire has made normal life impossible for the last four weeks. In the rest of the country, missile alerts send citizens into shelters multiple times a day, but most routines are otherwise unaffected.
  • In nearly forty days of fighting so far, 27 Israelis have been killed by Iranian missile fire. 30 were killed in the Twelve Day War last June.
  • Sgt. First Class Guy Ludar, 21 of Yuvalim in northern Israel, was killed in combat in southern Lebanon over the weekend. Ludar was accidentally killed by friendly fire during an engagement with Hezbollah terrorists in Shebaa just across the border. Another IDF soldier was wounded in the incident, and a wanted Hezbollah terrorist was captured.
  • Meanwhile the IDF continues its offensive in two theatres of operation.
  • Over the weekend, the IDF successfully targeted more leading figures in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including Majid Khademi, the IRGC’s chief of intelligence, and Yazdan Mir, the head of the IRGC’s Unit 840, its clandestine force charged with attacks and assassinations outside Iran.
  • The IDF also struck key economic and infrastructure targets in Iran over the weekend. In the city of Mahshahr, Iran’s largest petrochemical industrial complex was taken completely offline as a result of an Israeli air strike. Iran’s two largest steel factories were also shut down due to extensive damage from Israeli air strikes.
  • Overnight, the IDF also struck several military airports in and around Tehran, destroying the IRGC’s Air Force headquarters.
  • Media reports in the US, including in The New York Times, indicated some Israeli involvement in the successful US operation to rescue both crew members of the F-15 which was downed by Iranian fire deep in Iranian territory.
  • The IDF also reported striking 140 targets in Lebanon connected to Hezbollah and the Iranian regime. This morning the IDF reported having completed its takeover of the first line of mountain ridges beyond the northern border.
  • In terms of territory, this amounts to only a few kilometres, but it is intended to eliminate the threat of anti-tank missiles being fired at Israeli homes in front-line communities. This tactic, used by Hezbollah from October 2023 when it first launched a war on Israel following Hamas’s October 7 massacre, led to extensive destruction and made agricultural and communal life in Israeli border communities impossible.  

Context: After five weeks of nonstop aerial strikes agains Iran, the IDF announced that it finished strikes against “vital” targets, those connected to Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, and had moved to “secondary” targets, those connected to the regime’s economic viability.

  • Negotiations between Iran and the US are liable to consign Israeli concerns to a lower priority, so for Israel it is crucial now that if the regime does survive and, especially, if it still retains the 450 kg of enriched uranium which is believed to be buried deeply under the rubble of facilities damaged in last June’s Twelve Day War, then its ability to recover should be as limited and protracted as possible.
  • A ceasefire will leave  Iran in a much weakened state, with any threat from it to Israel pushed off into the future. But, by universal consensus in Israel, it will not succeed in fundamentally reorienting that threat unless the regime itself falls, something Israeli officials hope will happen in short order once the war ends, but cannot guarantee one way or another.
  • Israeli assessments regarding Hezbollah’s current capabilities are mixed. This is true both tactically and strategically.
    • Tactically, even a decapitated and isolated Hezbollah, routed by the IDF in September-November 2024 and cut off from its weapons land bridge by the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, was still able to regroup and rearm beyond some of Israel’s earlier assessments.
    • Strategically, no independent source of power in Lebanon and no international coalition of diplomatic partners has assembled the kind of incentive structure that would cause the Lebanese on their own to firmly move outside the orbit of Iranian dominance by means of Hezbollah’s weapons and infrastructure.
  • Pronouncements about the “banning” of Hezbollah or international efforts to “strengthen” the supposedly independent Lebanese Armed Forces have not fundamentally changed the fact that Lebanon is a country that enters wars with its southern neighbour based on the security needs and ideological and theological commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  • Regarding the ongoing war there are competing assessments and directives as well. Multiple leaks from senior IDF officers indicate that fully disarming Hezbollah is not considered a realistic goal of the current offensive. Leading ministers in Government are widely quoted as insisting that the war in Lebanon will continue even if a ceasefire is reached in Iran.
  • The IDF’s territorial advance reflects  the limited strategic goals. Israeli forces have cleared a buffer zone of six to ten kilometres from the border, taking frontline villages and towns out of range of anti-tank and sniper fire. But they have not reached the Litani River and do not, for now, appear to be moving in that direction.
  • IDF assessments are that at least 1,000 Hezbollah fighters have been killed in the last five weeks of hostilities. While Israeli officials acknowledge being surprised by Hezbollah’s ability to rearm after the November 2024 ceasefire, they also speak openly about being surprised in the other direction by its poor performance in battle in each tactical encounter with advancing IDF regiments. In particular, the “elite” Radwan force has proven far less effective than feared, and captured fighters interrogated by the IDF reveal a decidedly low motivation among its troops.

Looking ahead: The deadline for Trump’s ultimatum expires later today. The President has demanded Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz. If not, he has threatened strikes Iranian power plants and bridges. “Every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding and never to be used again,” he again warned last night, adding that “it will take them 100 years to rebuild.”

  • Israel too has issued a threat today to target significant Iranian infrastructure, warning Iranian citizens to stay away from all trains and rail lines until at least 9:00pm tonight.With Trump’s deadline looming, various initiatives for partial or temporary ceasefires have been floated, all involving some kind of opening of the vital Strait while negotiations begin on other outstanding issues.
  • Pakistan has put forward a proposal for a 45-day ceasefire that would immediately open the Strait to shipping traffic. Neither the US nor Iran have shown any public enthusiasm for the Pakistani proposal, with the Iranians putting forward an alternative ten-point plan whose details have not been made public. The Iranian proposal is believed to include a guarantee that the war would not restart following the ceasefire, a stipulation unlikely to be accepted by the Americans.
  • Oman too is involved in mediation, and the Omanis have floated the idea of a (possibly temporary) joint administration of the Strait of Hormuz by Oman and Iran.
  • Vice President JD Vance is en route to Hungary. American officials told reporters that his schedule could be readjusted if needed to meet Iranian officials or conduct indirect talks with them.

March 30, 2026

Houthis join war as IDF advances against Hezbollah

Reserve forces of the 769th Brigade Combat Team under the command of the 91st Division are conducting targeted ground operations to expand the security area in southern Lebanon.
Reserve forces of the 769th Brigade Combat Team under the command of the 91st Division are conducting targeted ground operations to expand the security area in southern Lebanon. Photo credit: IDF.

What’s happened: The Houthis, an Iran-backed jihadist militia that has controlled parts of Yemen for much of the last decade, launched at least two ballistic missiles at Israel over the weekend, joining the war after waiting on the sidelines for four weeks. Both missiles were intercepted.

  • The Houthis began attacking Israel on October 19, 2023, twelve days after the Hamas invasion and massacre in southern Israel, and continued firing missiles on Israel until the ceasefire which ended the Gaza war came into effect in October 2025.
  • Earlier in 2025 there was a short US-led bombing campaign against the Houthis that ended in a ceasefire which did not include Israel, which has been in effect since May 2025. This ceasefire resulted in the reopening of the Red Sea to most shipping traffic.
  • There is growing concern that the Houthis will once more endeavour to block shipping in the Red Sea and through to the Suez Canal by blockading the Bab al Mandab Strait.
  • President Trump’s ceasefire with the Houthis in May 2025 left Israel alone in fighting them for the next five months. Similarly, the regional effort to contain the Houthis led to a fierce division between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who backed different factions inside Yemen that were fighting the Iran-backed militia.
  • The IDF continued to operate in both Iran and Lebanon over the weekend. Overnight, the IDF  conducted 140 air strikes in Iran on targets connected to weapons production. These included facilities used for the production of anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, and ballistic missile engines.
  • The IDF also struck targets in Lebanon, including Hezbollah positions in Beirut. An air strike eliminated Ali Hassan Shaib, a senior operative in Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force. Three Israeli soldiers were seriously wounded in combat with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
  • Foreign Minister Saar informed this morning that he spoke with Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper. They’ve discussed:
    • The latest incidents in the UK, including the arson attacks on Hatzalah ambulance.
    • The rise of antisemitism in the West and the delegitimisation of the State of Israel. 
    • The situation in Lebanon, where according Saar “the Lebanese Foreign Ministry’s decision to expel the Iranian ambassador has remained on paper only. Just as the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah has also remained on paper only. Just as the Lebanese army’s statement three months ago claiming it had achieved ‘operational control’ in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River – was baseless.”
  • Over the weekend Sgt. Moshe Yitzchak Hacohen Katz, a 22-year-old from New Haven, Connecticut, was killed in action in southern Lebanon. Three other soldiers were moderately wounded in the same incident, in which the soldiers came under rocket fire.
  • This morning the army announced that Sgt, Litan Ben Zion, 19 from Holon, from the 401st Armoured Brigade was also killed by an anti-tank missile fired at his tank. An officer was seriously wounded in the same incident.    
  • In Tel Aviv, Viacheslav Vidment, a 52-year-old resident of Ashdod, was killed by an Iranian missile. Vidment worked as a security guard at a site that had been struck early in the war by an Iranian missile. Vidment did not enter a bomb shelter in response to the air raid siren, and was killed by missile debris that struck him in the head.
  • Yesterday, Knesset passed the budget bill for the current fiscal year in a 62 to 55 vote. Failure to pass a budget by March 31 would have led to automatic dissolving of parliament and early elections. Elections are currently scheduled for October of this year. The 850 billion shekel (£203bn)  budget includes 30 billion shekels (£7bn) in supplementary funding for defence, bringing the total defence budget to 142 billion shekels (£34bn).
    • Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich boasted yesterday that “for the first time since 1988, the government will complete its term and has passed four annual budgets, and all that while at war.”
    • Opposition leader Yair Lapid blasted the roughly 6 billion shekels (£1.4bn) of “coalition funds,” mostly sectoral earmarks, in the budget. As an example, he pointed to 49 million shekels (£11.7m) set aside ostensibly to prevent dropouts from yeshiva programmes. “We aren’t stupid,” he said. “We know what a program to prevent dropouts from yeshivas is. It’s a program designed to prevent young Haredi men from enlisting in the IDF.  This isn’t money for security. This is 49 million shekels to damage security (£11.7m).”

Context: Gulf diplomacy had, in the years immediately before the current war, been seen to be moving away from a dependence only on the United States. China and Russia had made inroads, and the Saudis had even concluded a bilateral defence pact with a nearby declared nuclear power, Pakistan. But so far in the current war, that pact hasn’t had any material impact, and in fact Pakistan has positioned itself as a neutral mediator between the US and Iran.

  • The UAE is in a particularly tight spot between Israel, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran.
  • According to the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, only 17 percent of Iranian missiles and drones have been aimed at Israel in the current war, with the rest targeting Gulf countries. And of the 4,391 targeting the Gulf, 2,156 (nearly half) have targeted the UAE.The Emiratis  have quietly frozen Iranian assets in their country. More than 8,000 Iranian firms have operations in the UAE, something which until the current war effectively helped Iran circumvent sanctions.
  • In the months leading up to the war, the UAE was involved in a bitter clash with Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen, with the two countries backing different forces in the effort to contain the Iran-backed Houthis.
  • As far as the Pakistani-sponsored mediation, little is known publicly about the progress of diplomatic negotiations.
    • Multiple media reports suggest that the Iranian position, to the extent there is a coherent Iranian position, is more open to compromise than what was suggested by the Iranian proposal for ending the war last week, which was an effective rejection of the US 15-point plan.
    • Internal divisions between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on the one hand, and more radical figures from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the other, are widely seen as contributing to the delayed Iranian response.
    • Reportedly, Iran conveyed a willingness for a significant, but not full, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an immediate US-Israeli ceasefire while negotiations were conducted on other outstanding issues. This proposal was rejected by the Trump administration.
  • US officials believe that the mounting economic damage to Iran will exert a pressure on Tehran far greater than the accumulating economic damage Iran has been able to impose on the rest of the world.
  • In Iran itself, civil servants have not been paid since the war began, ATM’s have run out of cash, and inflation has risen to 120% on an annualised basis. Even Iran’s much hyped ability to sell oil to neutral countries at imported prices has only yielded about $2 billion in revenue, significantly less than what Iran was able to make from selling oil beforehand at the lower prewar prices.

Looking ahead: The various diplomatic initiatives are taking place on the backdrop of a new US deadline for an agreement and an implied threat for a limited ground operation. The latest extension of President Trump’s ultimatum runs to April 6.

  • But the gradual buildup of US marine and airborne forces in the region has led analysts to speculate that an entirely different operation is under consideration.
  • The four possibilities most discussed include:
    • Invading and occupying Kharg Island, from which nearly all of Iran’s oil is exported. This would cripple the Iranian economy even further, but it is not clear if this would actually force Tehran to back down. Facilities on the island could be destroyed either in battle or by retreating Iranian forces themselves.
    • Reopening by force the Strait of Hormuz, possibly including a small littoral offensive on the Iranian coast.
    • Taking several disputed islands in the Gulf that have been occupied by Iran since the 1970s, possibly in cooperation with Gulf countries who claim them, most notably the UAE.
    • A complex operation to seize the estimated 450 kg of highly enriched uranium believed to still be in Iran’s possession. The HEU is believed to be buried under two Iranian nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Natanz that were heavily damaged by US air strikes in last June’s war.

March 26, 2026

Iranian attacks persist as Israel escalates strikes on key military targets

Israeli security and rescue forces inspect the damage at the scene where a missile fired from Iran toward Israel caused damage in Kiryat Ata, northern Israel, March 26, 2026.
Israeli security and rescue forces inspect the damage at the scene where a missile fired from Iran toward Israel caused damage in Kiryat Ata, northern Israel, March 26, 2026. Photo by Michael Giladi/Flash90

What’s happened: Missile attacks from Iran and rocket attacks from Lebanon continued to strike Israeli cities and towns overnight and this morning. Injuries were reported in Kafr Qassem, a large Arab town in central Israel northeast of Tel Aviv, as well as in Shaar Shomron, a small West Bank settlement, and Kiryat Bialik, a suburb of Haifa, from Iranian illegal cluster munitions.

  • In the past 24 hours  Hezbollah launched approximately 600 rockets, drones, and mortars toward Israel and IDF soldiers operating  in southern Lebanon.
  • Israel’s offensive in Lebanon and Iran continued, even as diplomatic developments lead to changing target priorities on both fronts.
    • An IDF soldier was killed and another was wounded in a firefight in southern Lebanon. Staff Sgt. Ori Greenberg, 21, of the Golani Brigade’s Reconnaissance Unit was killed in an exchange of fire with Hezbollah guerrillas in southern Lebanon early this morning.
    • The IDF reports that several Hezbollah fighters were killed in the operation without giving an exact number. The IDF also released footage this morning of the demolition of a Hezbollah command centre as well as a weapons depot that were both destroyed in an operation by carried out by the Golani Brigade.
    • The IDF also reported this morning that it had successfully eliminated the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, Alireza Tangsiri in Bandar Abbas, the Iranian port on the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz. Tangsiri was the man responsible for the closure of the Strait, which has been the one significant Iranian tactical success in the war so far.
    • The IDF also struck major naval and aerial weapons development sites in Iran yesterday, with particular emphasis on sites in Isfahan. The strikes included Iran’s Underwater Research Centre in Isfahan, the only facility in Iran for the design and development of submarines and support systems for the Iranian Navy.
  • The US reported that as of yesterday it had hit 10,000 targets in Iran so far. The number did not include targets hit by Israel.
  • Iran publicly rejected the US 15-point plan for ending the war. The proposal was conveyed to Iran by Pakistan, and was believed to offer sanctions relief in exchange for major Iranian concessions on its nuclear programme, ballistic missile programme, support for regional proxies, and the ongoing Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
  • In anticipation of a possible US invasion of its strategically important Kharg Island, Iran made several dramatic threats yesterday against the US and its allies. Military officials threatened to target shipping in the Red Sea — something that Iran would be unlikely to pull off on its own, but would indicate the entry into the conflict of its proxy militia in Yemen, the Houthis.
  • Iran also claimed that an unnamed Gulf state was planning on joining the US in an invasion of Kharg, and threatened to attack vital infrastructure in that unnamed country if such an invasion were to be launched.
  • In Kuwait, six men were arrested over an alleged Hezbollah plot to assassinate Kuwaiti leaders. According to Kuwaiti reports, fourteen more members of the terror cell managed to flee the country before arrest.

Context: Though the positions of the US and Iran are still miles apart, Israeli officials take very seriously the possibility that the US will declare a ceasefire as early as this weekend. This possibility has several implications for how Israel conducts its offensive in the coming days.

  • The choice of targets in Iran being hit by the Israeli Air Force has shifted this week to largely military targets, with much less emphasis on regime targets. What this means practically is that Israel is using what might be a limited and closing window of opportunity to degrade as much as possible Iran’s capacity to store, manufacture, or develop weapons that would serve it in future rounds of fighting.
  • At the same time, the Israel has scaled back the strikes against Basij and other targets that would weaken the regime and making cracking down on a new uprising after a ceasefire harder. This could either be because of an assessment that the regime is now stable, or that the effort expended on each Basij strike — for example, taking out one checkpoint — is far too high relative to the benefit. If it is really the case that the war could be ending before a decisive blow is delivered to the regime, Israeli decision makers might calculate that it is best to use the time remaining to weaken Iran’s capacity to attack Israel in the future.
  • The possibility of a ceasefire also affects Israel’s calculations in Lebanon. Israel has thus far refrained from a large land operation in Lebanon, though it has moved limited forces in and established strongpoints beyond those that were left from the 2024 ceasefire. With most of the Lebanon offensive thus far having been an Air Force operation, and the Air Force needed to put in the final blows in Iran, the Lebanon offensive has been, in the last two days at least, pushed down the priority list.
  • There is also a debate in Israel about striking major infrastructure targets in Iran, with serious consideration being given to pushing that before a ceasefire is implemented. The perception in Iran that the Islamic regime has won the war is not just propaganda, but appears to reflect how Iranian officials genuinely believe events have unfolded. To this end, Israeli decision makers, together with many in the Gulf countries too, believe that only significant damage to Iranian energy infrastructure can change that perception, with all the anticipated effects both regionally and domestically.

Looking ahead: Major diplomatic efforts are underway to reach an agreement between Iran and the United States that would bring an end to the current war.

  • Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan have positioned themselves as mediators between the two warring parties. Oman, which had mediated talks before the war broke out, has faded somewhat.
  • Pakistani efforts have received the most public attention. There were conflicting reports yesterday that US Vice President JD Vance could be headed to Islamabad for indirect talks with the Iranians.
  • Meanwhile, Pakistani officials claimed that they conveyed a request to Israel not to eliminate Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and its parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, so that the two men could conduct indirect talks with the US under Pakistani mediation. According to the same Pakistani officials, Israel acceded to the request.

March 25, 2026

Lebanon expels Iranian ambassador as US pushes 15-point Iran plan

Zaka personnel work at the scene where a woman was killed by missile shrapnel following a rocket fired toward Israel near Rosh Pina, northern Israel, March 24, 2026.
Zaka personnel work at the scene where a woman was killed by missile shrapnel following a rocket fired toward Israel near Rosh Pina, northern Israel, March 24, 2026. Photo by David Cohen/Flash90

What’s happened: A Hezbollah rocket killed an Israeli woman in northern Israel yesterday. Nuriel Dubin, aged 27, was in her car when a rocket struck the Mahanayim Junction. Her fiancé was injured in the attack. The two had met in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 attack when he was evacuated from his home to a hotel in the Kinneret area where she worked as a teacher.

  • Since Hezbollah entered the war on March 2, the Iran-backed terrorist group in Lebanon has been launching an average of 150 rockets a day. Some of its barrages have been timed with Iranian missile attacks on Israel’s north as well. Over the same period, according to official Israeli figures, the IDF has killed 600 Hezbollah combatants, including 220 of the group’s elite Radwan Force.
  • In the most significant diplomatic development on Israeli northern border, Lebanon has expelled the Iranian ambassador yesterday and withdrawn their own ambassador from Tehran. This a further escalation of tensions between the two countries, following the expulsion of Iranian military personnel last week.
  • Following on the dramatic announcement by President Trump the day before to defer planned attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure, the US yesterday conveyed to Iran a 15-point plan for ending the current war. The text of the plan has not been made public, but according to media reports, it goes far beyond a simple ceasefire and includes details regarding most of the outstanding issues that were being negotiated by the two sides in the weeks prior to the Israeli attacks on Iran in June 2025 and February 2026. These include not just the Iranian nuclear programme, but also the ballistic missile programme and Iran’s support for regional proxies.
  • The plan was conveyed through Pakistan, which has emerged as a possible mediator between Iran and the United States, along with Oman, Egypt and Turkey. Notably, there has been no reported mediation role for Qatar, which has found itself on the receiving end of Iranian missile and drone attacks since the current war began.
  • President Trump struck an optimistic note regarding the diplomatic process, noting that “we’re talking to the right people,” without revealing who those people were. He alluded cryptically to a significant Iranian concession, without saying what it was. “They gave us a present, and the present arrived today,” Trump said to reporters in the Oval Office. “I’m not going to tell you what that present is, but it was a very significant prize.” Pressed for more details, he would only say that it was “oil- and gas-related.” Other reports during the day indicated that Iran was considering opening the passage through the Straits of Hormuz to non-belligerent countries, something that if implemented would remove a major looming threat to global energy markets.
  • With the US threat to attack energy infrastructure off the table until the end of trading this week, oil prices have fallen again to around $90 a barrel on global markets.
  • More details were reported today regarding Israel’s air strike on Iran’s Caspian port Bandar Anzali last Wednesday. Satellite images show significant damage to Iran’s naval headquarters and numerous destroyed naval vessels. The IAF hit dozens of targets including warships, a port, a command centre and a shipyard used to repair and maintain vessels. The attack hobbled a smuggling route that was crucial for both Iranian and Russian war efforts and sanctions evasion.
  • Meanwhile, the UK has offered to host a security summit about opening the Strait of Hormuz.

Context: The exact text of the American 15-point proposal is unknown.

  • However, it  is believed to contain some of the following conditions:
    • Three main nuclear sites in Iran would be dismantled.
    • All enrichment activities in Iran would be banned.
    • The ballistic missile programme would be suspended.
    • Support for regional proxies would be curbed.
    • The Strait of Hormuz would be fully reopened.
    • Sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme would be lifted. Sanctions connected to human rights abuses would stay in place.
    • The United States would provide direct assistance for Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, while also monitoring it.
  • It is unclear what the US propose to do with the 450kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and whether they will seek to remove it or dilute it.
  • The Iranians have also made a list of demands for an agreement with the US. Some of them would be extraordinary gains for Iran even if the war had been characterised by stunning Iranian military successes, which it decidedly has not been. These demands include:
    • Turning the Strait of Hormuz into an Iranian-managed passageway where Iran would collect fees, similar to the Suez Canal — though of course, the Suez Canal artificial and located inside Egypt and the Strait of Hormuz in an international waterway.
    • Guarantees that neither Israel nor the US could attack Iran again, together with a guarantee that Israel could not attack Lebanon.
    • The lifting of all sanctions on Iran, not just those related to the nuclear programme.
    • Permitting Iran to keep and develop ballistic missiles with no limitations.
  • Israeli officials remain sceptical regarding the prospects of an agreement along the lines of either proposal. To the extent one can be reached, Israel is concerned that the implementation will run along the lines of ceasefires with Hamas and Hezbollah, with the major steps called for in the beginning carried out in full, but with the provisions regarding disarmament dragging on to the point where attention lags, urgency fades, and the threat to renew hostilities in light of violations becomes ineffective.

Looking ahead: In the meantime, US continues to move Marines and airborne forces into the theatre of conflict, raising the possibility of a limited land manoeuvre either on Kharg Island or on shore of the Hormuz Strait. 3,000 troops are reported to have arrived already. 2,200 more Marines are due on Friday.

  • Even a successful agreement on Iran won’t necessarily end the current fighting in Lebanon where Israel has yet to embark on a large land offensive. Israel destroyed five more bridges of the Litani River over the past 48 hours, and according to Defence Minister Katz, “the IDF will control the remaining bridges and the security zone up to the Litani.”

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